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NOTHING IS INEVITABLE: 
A REJECTION OF THE INEVITABLE 
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE UNDER 
THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
JACQUELINE R. MANCINI† 
INTRODUCTION 
Until June 2013, Manish Desai worked for Molon Motor and 
Coil Corporation (“Molon”) as Head of Quality Control.1  In June 
of that year, Desai left Molon to take a position with a competitor of 
Molon, Nidec Motor Corporation (“Nidec”).2  Molon brought suit 
against Nidec for trade secret misappropriation and alleged that 
Desai copied confidential information onto a flash drive before his 
departure.3  Based on these allegations, Molon argued not only that 
Desai unlawfully disclosed its trade secrets but also that “Nidec 
used and continues to use that information.”4  Molon brought suit 
under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Illinois 
Trade Secrets Act.5  The District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois allowed Molon’s claims against Nidec to proceed based 
on the “inevitable disclosure doctrine.”6  Molon’s complaint made 
no allegations that Nidec, rather than Desai, misappropriated 
 
† Associate Mangaging Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D., 2020, St. John’s 
University School of Law, B.A., 2016, St. John’s University. I would like to thank 
Professor Anita Krishnakumar for her invaluable expertise and guidance. I am also 
grateful to my family and friends for their love and support while completing my 
Note and throughout my law school career. 
1 Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 
1954531, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
2 Id. at *2. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at *1. 
6 Id. at *7. 
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Molon’s trade secrets.7  Nonetheless, the court concluded that the 
competition between the parties and the “similarity” of Desai’s 
employment at Nidec were “enough to trigger the circumstantial 
inference that the trade secrets inevitably would be disclosed by 
Desai to Nidec.”8  
The court’s analysis in Molon is only one example of the 
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  The inevitable 
disclosure doctrine permits a “plaintiff [to] prove a claim of trade 
secret misappropriation by demonstrating that [a] defendant’s 
new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s 
trade secrets.”9  The doctrine is often used when an employee 
stops working for the owner of a trade secret and begins working 
for a competitor.10  However, application of the doctrine could in-
hibit employee mobility and free trade.11  Because an employer 
could be held liable merely based on the decision to hire an em-
ployee, employees are discouraged from taking on a superior 
position with a competing employer.12  This theory of liability 
also increases the risks involved when a former employee, who 
may have had access to trade secrets, starts a new company with 
innovative ideas.13  For these reasons, the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine remains controversial, and not all courts have adopted it.14 
In 2016, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) created a 
federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.15  
In the few years since the DTSA’s passage, the fate of the inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine remains unclear.16  Under the DTSA, one 
 
7 Id. at *5 (“Molon ‘provides no specific allegations that would plausibly show that 
Mr. Desai disclosed the alleged trade secrets to [Nidec] or that [Nidec] otherwise 
obtained and used any information . . . .’ ”). 
8 Id. at *7. 
9 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 
10 See Molon Motor & Coil Corp., 2017 WL 1954531, at *7. 
11 See Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee 
Mobility v. Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 178 (2004). 
12 See id. 
13 See Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable 
Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809, 844 (1999). 
14 See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 173. Only eight states clearly apply the doc-
trine, six states apply a limited version, and the remainder either reject the doctrine 
outright or lack explicit caselaw on the subject. See Brandy L. Treadway, Comment, 
An Overview of Individual States’ Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete 
Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621, 626–48 (2002) (providing an 
overview of different states’ approaches to the doctrine). 
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2018). 
16 Brittany S. Bruns, Note, Criticism of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016: 
Failure to Preempt, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 488 (2017) (“[W]hether the in-
2020]  NOTHING IS INEVITABLE 207 
form of relief available is an injunction to prevent the disclosure 
or use of the trade secret at issue.17  The statute indicates that 
such injunctions may not place restrictions on employee mobil-
ity.18  This limitation, which prevents the injunctive relief provi-
sion from impacting employment, appears to disfavor the inevitable 
disclosure theory of liability.  However, as the Molon case demon-
strates, the doctrine could still be used to prove the alleged 
misappropriation of a trade secret.19  This ambiguity has led 
some district courts to decline to apply the doctrine, some to 
choose to apply the doctrine, and others to fail to reach the merits 
of the issue.20 
This Note argues that moving forward, federal courts should 
reject the inevitable disclosure doctrine in cases arising under 
the DTSA.  Apart from the potential adverse effects on employ-
ment, application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine and the 
rationales behind it are inconsistent with both the text of the 
DTSA and its legislative history.  This Note examines how the text 
of the statute and its legislative history support this interpretation. 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine and the passage of the DTSA.  Before dis-
cussing the DTSA and the changes it made to trade secret law, it 
is necessary to explain the origins and purpose of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine.  The doctrine was developed by state courts 
as an equitable remedy in instances where there was no direct 
evidence that any disclosure of a trade secret had taken place.21  
The DTSA, on the other hand, is designed to fill a gap in federal 
law by creating a federal civil cause of action for trade secret 
misappropriation.22  Thus, the DTSA ensured that the owners of 
 
evitable disclosure doctrine may be used to prove misappropriation is an open 
question.”). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A). 
18 Id. 
19 See Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2017 WL 
1954531, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
20 See, e.g., UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. Li, No. 17-CV-01704, 2017 WL 6405620, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017) (rejecting the doctrine); Oakwood Labs., LLC v. Thanoo, 
No. 17-CV-05090, 2017 WL 5762393, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2017) (failing to reach 
the inevitable disclosure question); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 
WL 3970593, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (applying the doctrine and granting an 
injunction against defendant). 
21 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) 
(“Equitable intervention is sanctioned when it appears, as it does in the instant case, 
that there exists a present real threat of disclosure, even without actual disclosure.”). 
22 162 CONG. REC. H2032 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
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trade secrets would no longer be confined to state law remedies.23  
Part I also explores how this federal statute intersects with the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
Part II of this Note analyzes the DTSA, using traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation.  First, it argues that the text of 
the DTSA does not support the application of the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine to cases brought under the federal statute.  
Second, Part II argues that the legislative history of the DTSA 
conflicts with an application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
under the DTSA.  In the debate and reports on the DTSA, mem-
bers of Congress indicated that they understood trade secret 
misappropriation to refer to deliberate theft of trade secrets, not 
the eventual disclosure of information contemplated by the inevi-
table disclosure doctrine.24  Finally, Part II argues that while the 
DTSA does not preempt the inevitable disclosure doctrine, appli-
cation of the doctrine is inconsistent with both the text and 
legislative history of the Act. 
Part III of this Note argues that concerns over employment 
and employment mobility strongly discourage the application of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the DTSA.  The potential 
impact of the application of the doctrine is particularly striking 
considering that Congress sought to create a uniform federal 
cause of action.25  The use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
could lead to inconsistent, fragmented effects on employment in 
different regions of the country. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
Trade secret theft is a crime under state and federal law.26  
Additionally, under both state trade secret laws and the DTSA, 
the owner of a trade secret may bring a civil cause of action 
against a person who misappropriates its trade secrets.27  In ad-
dition to seeking damages, the owner of a trade secret may also 
seek injunctive relief to maintain the secrecy of the information 
 
23 See Martin J. Salvucci, Note, A Federalist Account of the Law of Trade 
Secrecy, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 191 (2018). 
24 See 162 CONG. REC. S1634 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
25 See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 14–15 (2016). 
26 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West 2019); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1832 
(2018). 
27 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-27-4 (2019); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1836. 
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and prevent the defendant’s continued use of the information.28  
Where direct evidence of misappropriation is lacking, some states 
apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine to authorize relief in a 
given case.29 
Specifically, the inevitable disclosure doctrine allows a plaintiff 
to “prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demon-
strating that [the] defendant’s new employment will inevitably 
lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”30  The doctrine is 
typically applied in instances where a plaintiff cannot produce 
direct evidence of misappropriation.31  New York courts were the 
first to articulate the doctrine, arguing that one could rely on the 
circumstantial inference that the plaintiff’s former employee 
would eventually disclose the plaintiff’s trade secrets by virtue of 
the new employment relationship.32  In other early cases, state 
courts found that leaving a company to work for a competitor was 
a breach of the employer’s confidence and trust, and determined 
that such behavior should be enjoined.33  The doctrine was used 
to give the owner of a trade secret recourse even when evidence 
of direct misappropriation was unavailable.34 
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit considered PepsiCo, Inc. v. 
Redmond, a seminal case that confirmed that the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine could be a “legitimate basis” for injunctive relief 
to prevent the disclosure of a trade secret.35  The plaintiff, PepsiCo, 
had asserted that the defendant, Redmond, could not help but 
rely on PepsiCo’s trade secrets in the course of his new employ-
ment.36  Although the court conceded that PepsiCo had “not 
brought a traditional trade secret case,” the court found that 
 
28 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
29 JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 7.02(2)(b)(ii) (2013) (“Nevertheless, circum-
stances may be such that the likelihood of disclosure or misuse by a competitor 
appears overwhelming to the court.”). 
30 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 
31 William Lynch Schaller et al., Trade Secret “Triggers”: What Facts Warrant 
Litigation?, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 625, 636 (2018). 
32 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., Inc., 189 A.D. 556, 561 (4th Dep’t 
1919) (“The mere rendition of the service along the lines of his training would almost 
necessarily impart such knowledge to some degree.”). 
33 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). 
34 See id. The first court to describe disclosure as occurring “inevitably” in this 
context was the Delaware Court of Chancery. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 435 (Del. Ch. 1964) (“Plaintiff says that on 
this record an issue is created as to whether disclosure will inevitably or probably 
follow from Hirsch’s employment by Potash . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
35 Godfrey, supra note 11, at 170. 
36 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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disclosure of PepsiCo’s information was inevitable “unless Redmond 
possessed an uncanny ability to compartmentalize information.”37  
Despite the fact that there were no allegations of trade secret 
theft, the Court granted an injunction because Redmond’s in-
evitable use of confidential information would harm PepsiCo’s 
interests.38  The court compared PepsiCo to “a coach, one of 
whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing 
team before the big game.”39  Following PepsiCo, use of the doc-
trine increased in many jurisdictions, in part due to the growth of 
information technology and the ease with which such information 
could be stolen.40 
However, not all states recognize the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine as a lawful remedy within trade secret law.41  While the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act permits an injunction of either 
“[a]ctual or threatened” misappropriation of protected material,42 
not all courts have interpreted the word “threatened” to autho-
rize an injunction under an inevitable disclosure theory.43  Due to 
its potential impacts on employee mobility, the doctrine has 
remained controversial44 and has been adopted in a minority of 
jurisdictions.45  Proponents of the doctrine argue that disclosure 
or use of confidential information and trade secrets is unavoid-
able if a former employee begins working for a competitor in the 
same industry.46 
Although there is no universal definition of the elements of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine,47 most courts require that: 
(1) “trade secrets exists,” (2) “the employee had access to them,” 
and (3) the secrets will “inevitably be used.”48  In applying PepsiCo, 
courts have articulated a variety of factors to determine when 
 
37 Id. at 1269–70. 
38 See id. at 1270. 
39 Id. 
40 Godfrey, supra note 11, at 173. 
41 See id. 
42 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).  
43 Gregory Porter & Joseph Beauchamp, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and 
Its Effect on Employee Mobility, HOUS. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 36, 38. 
44 See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 173. 
45 Only eight states have explicitly adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
See Treadway, supra note 14, at 626–32. 
46 See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 166. 
47 Id. at 174. 
48 See Porter & Beauchamp, supra note 43, at 37. 
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disclosure of a trade secret is “inevitable.”49  These factors involve 
“the level of competition between the [plaintiff] and the new 
employer,” the similarity between the employee’s former position 
and their new position, and whether the circumstances indicate 
the new employee will not safeguard the plaintiff’s trade secrets.50 
B. State Trade Secret Law Since the Passage of the DTSA 
1. The Lack of Uniformity in State Trade Secret Law 
The law governing trade secrets originated in state common 
law.51  Each state developed its own law of trade secrecy, leading 
to an inherent “lack of uniformity” that “became increasingly 
problematic” when interstate commerce increased in the early 
twentieth century.52  In 1939, section 757 of the First Restate-
ment of Torts consolidated the common law of trade secrets 
across the various states.53  In 1979, the Uniform Law Commis-
sion sponsored the creation of the Uniform Trade Secret Act, 
which follows the approach of the First Restatement.54  “Within 
ten years of the UTSA’s publication,” over thirty states adopted 
the model statute in its entirety or in a modified form.55  As of 
2013, when Texas adopted the UTSA, only three states remain 
that have not adopted the statute: New York, North Carolina, 
and Massachusetts.56 
Under the UTSA, misappropriation of a trade secret involves 
the “acquisition, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use of a 
trade secret” that was acquired through “improper means, either 
by a defendant or by a person from whom the defendant derived 
knowledge of a trade secret.”57  The UTSA defines “[i]mproper 
 
49 See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, No. 06-CV-02972, 2008 WL 9894350, at *18 
(D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2008) (identifying six factors for the conclusion that disclosure is in-
evitable); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (identifying 
three factors). 
50 Nucor Corp., 2008 WL 9894350, at *18; RKI, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 876. 
51 Robert Denicola, The Restatements, the Uniform Act and the Status of 
American Trade Secret Law, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HAND-
BOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 18, 18 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. 
Strandburg eds., 2011). 
52 See id. at 19. 
53 Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Uniform Trade Secrets Act—Trends and Prospects, 
33 HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 410 & n.4 (2010). 
54 See Salvucci, supra note 23, at 186–87. 
55 Id. at 187. 
56 Id. at 187 & n.34. 
57 Dole, supra note 53, at 425. 
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means” as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or induce-
ment of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage 
through electronic or other means.”58  Trade secrets are defined 
as “information” that “derives independent economic value” from 
not being generally known and that is subject to “efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”59 
However, despite the adoption of the UTSA, states vary in 
what is required for a plaintiff to prove a claim of trade secret 
misappropriation.60  Varying by state, the prima facie case has 
between two and six elements.61  For example, in Ohio, to estab-
lish a claim for trade secret misappropriation, a plaintiff must 
prove that (1) “a trade secret exists,” (2) the “secret was acquired 
[via] a confidential relationship,” and (3) the trade secret was 
used without authorization.62  By contrast, the elements of the 
claim in Oregon are “(1) a valuable commercial design, (2) a con-
fidential relationship between the party asserting trade secret 
protection and the party who disclosed the information[,] and 
(3) the key features of the design that were the creative product 
of the party asserting protection.”63  In Wisconsin, the elements 
differ once again; courts in that state require that (1) the defen-
dant acted improperly, (2) “the information was substantially 
secret,” (3) “reasonable efforts were made to keep [the information] 
secret,” and (4) “the defendant knew or should have known that 
its action was improper.”64 
2. The DTSA Creates a Federal Cause of Action 
The first federal foray into trade secret law was the Eco-
nomic Espionage Act (“EEA”) of 1996, which criminalized the 
theft of a trade secret on behalf of a foreign government or for 
“monetary gain.”65  The EEA also prohibited attempted theft of 
trade secrets and conspiracy to steal trade secrets.66  Throughout 
 
58 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). 
59 Id. § 1(4). 
60 See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation 
in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 91 (2010–2011). 
61 Id. 
62 Penetone Corp. v. Palchem, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1985). 
63 Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 1991). 
64 RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 267 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Wis. 1978). 
65 David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical 
Study of the First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 105, 114 (2018); Salvucci, supra note 23, at 188. 
66 Salvucci, supra note 23, at 188. 
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the 1990s and 2000s, various trade groups lobbied Congress for 
the creation of a civil cause of action under the EEA due to the 
lack of uniformity at the state level.67  “In February 2013, a 
White House–sponsored task force” reported that the pace of 
trade secret theft was “accelerating” around the country.68  In 
2010, trade secret litigation was “on the rise” at the state level, 
and a majority of states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin 
Islands had “adopted trade secret statutes in the [prior] three 
decades.”69 
The DTSA was a bipartisan effort authored by Republican 
Senator Orrin Hatch and Democratic Senator Chris Coons.70  The 
bill was designed to bring “uniformity to trade secret litigation so 
creators and owners of trade secrets can more effectively address 
the growing problem of trade secret theft.”71  The drafters sought 
to eliminate the procedural hurdles faced by the owners of trade 
secrets when navigating the patchwork of state trade secret laws 
by creating a federal remedy.72  Trade secrets become less valu-
able once they are disclosed or used without authorization; 
Congress sought to create a speedy remedy for companies to use 
to protect their trade secrets.73  The bill ultimately passed the 
Senate eighty-seven votes to zero and passed the House 410 votes 
to two.74  President Obama signed the DTSA into law on May 11, 
2016.75 
The DTSA amended the EEA to establish a federal civil 
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.76  Previously, 
18 U.S.C. § 1836 had only authorized the Attorney General to 
bring a civil action to obtain injunctive relief where there was a 
violation of the criminal statute.77  To bring a cause of action 
 
67 See id. at 188–89. 
68 Id. at 190. 
69 See Almeling et al., supra note 60, at 93. 
70 162 CONG. REC. S1635 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
71 Id. 
72 162 CONG. REC. H2032 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
73 Id.  
74 Vicki Needham, President Obama Signs Trade Secrets Bill, THE HILL (May 
11, 2016, 6:06 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/279608-president-obama-
signs-trade-secrets-bill [https://perma.cc/5Y54-F7BS]. 
75 Linda K. Stevens, President Obama Signs Defend Trade Secrets Act, ABA: 
PRACTICE POINTS (May 13, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/ 
committees/intellectual-property/practice/2016/president-obama-signs-defend-trade-
secrets-act/ [https://perma.cc/L7QJ-NKML]. 
76 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016). 
77 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a) (2012), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2018). 
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under the DTSA, an owner of a trade secret may bring a civil 
claim, provided the secret is “related to a product or service used 
in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.”78  A plaintiff may seek a 
civil seizure order, injunctive relief, or monetary damages.79  The 
introduction of the civil cause of action gave trade secrets the 
similar level of federal protection as copyrights, patents, and 
trademarks.80 
The civil seizure provision of the DTSA permits the owner of 
a trade secret to make an ex parte application to seize property 
necessary to prevent the disclosure or dissemination of the trade 
secret at issue in the case.81  Notably, the statute indicates that 
the ex parte seizure provision should be invoked only in “extra-
ordinary circumstances.”82  Congress also placed a limitation on 
the scope of injunctive relief under the DTSA; the injunctions 
may not “prevent a person from entering into an employment 
relationship” or “otherwise conflict with an applicable State law 
prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, 
trade, or business.”83  When seeking monetary damages, a 
plaintiff can recover for any “actual loss” stemming from misap-
propriation or “unjust enrichment.”84  A detailed analysis of the 
DTSA’s provisions follows in Part II. 
3. The Fate of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Under the 
DTSA Thus Far 
Since the passage of the DTSA, a number of district courts 
have directly confronted the application of the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine in cases brought under the federal statute.  District 
courts have taken a variety of different approaches to arguments 
made under an inevitable disclosure theory; some have explicitly 
recognized the doctrine and applied it to cases brought under the 
DTSA.85  Other courts have explicitly rejected the doctrine’s ap-
 
78 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2018). 
79 Id. § 1836(b)(1)–(3). 
80 See Levine & Seaman, supra note 65, at 107. 
81 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. § 1836(b)(3). 
84 Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B). 
85 See, e.g., Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Synchrony Group, LLC, 343 F. Supp. 3d 434, 
445–46 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (construing the DTSA’s “threatened misappropriation” to in-
clude inevitable disclosure); PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Huttig Bldg. Prods., 
Inc., Nos. 16 CV 11390, 16 CV 11468, 2017 WL 7795125, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 
2017); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 
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plication to federal trade secret misappropriation claims.86  Still 
others have failed to take a clear stance on the issue.87 
For example, the Northern District of Illinois applied the 
doctrine in Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer.88  The plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant, a former employee, took a new position with the 
plaintiff’s main competitor.89  Despite a lack of direct evidence of 
trade secret theft or misappropriation, the court concluded that 
there was reason to believe that the defendant would inevitably 
use the plaintiff’s trade secrets and granted the plaintiff’s in-
junction on that basis.90  
By contrast, the District Court for the Northern District of 
California explicitly rejected the doctrine in UCAR Tech. (USA), 
Inc. v. Li.91  The defendants argued that the plaintiff’s DTSA claim 
was based on the inevitable disclosure theory, which courts in Cal-
ifornia have failed to adopt.92  However, the court found that 
several of the plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation claims fell 
within the definition of the DTSA and did not need the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine.93  California had previously rejected the doc-
trine under its own trade secret statute in Whyte v. Schlage Lock 
Co.94 
Notably, other states have failed to take a definitive stance 
on the issue of the doctrine’s application.  For example, in Free 
Country Ltd. v. Drennan, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York noted that a plaintiff could “theoretically 
 
Sept. 8, 2017); Panera, LLC. v. Nettles, No. 16-CV-1181, 2016 WL 4124114, at *4 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016). 
86 See, e.g., UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. Li, No. 17-CV-01704, 2017 WL 6405620, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017). 
87 See, e.g., Oakwood Labs., LLC v. Thanoo, No. 17-CV-05090, 2017 WL 5762393, 
at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff did not allege the trade secrets 
at issue with sufficient specificity); Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick, No. 16-13703, 
2017 WL 4039178, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017) (holding plaintiff made suffi-
cient allegations to support a misappropriation claim independent of an inevitable 
disclosure theory); Chubb INA Holdings Inc. v. Chang, No. 16-2354, 2017 WL 499682, 
at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2017) (holding that plaintiff alleged actual use of a trade secret, 
rather than inevitable disclosure); Free Country Ltd. v. Drennan, 235 F. Supp. 3d 
559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that a plaintiff could “theoretically lodge an inevi-
table disclosure claim,” but had not done so here). 
88 2017 WL 3970593, at *13. 
89 Id. at *12. 
90 Id. at *13. 
91 2017 WL 6405620, at *3. 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“[O]ur rejection of the inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine is complete.”). 
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lodge an inevitable disclosure claim based on the information” 
that the employee had access to.95  However, the court concluded 
that it was not physically possible for the employee to retain the 
information in a form that would be useful to the plaintiff’s 
competitor.96 
II.  THE TEXT AND THE HISTORY OF THE DEFEND 
TRADE SECRETS ACT DO NOT SUPPORT THEAPPLICATION 
OF THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE 
This Note argues that both the statutory text and the leg-
islative history of the DTSA are in direct opposition to the views 
of courts that have opted to apply the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine under the Act.  Some commentators and scholars have 
argued that the DTSA fails to effectively preempt the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine.97  Such scholars suggest that the DTSA should 
be amended to explicitly preempt the doctrine.98  However, this 
Note argues that amendment of the DTSA is unnecessary be-
cause the text and legislative history of the Act are sufficient to 
preclude the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  
Courts applying the doctrine are failing to read the statute as a 
whole and are disregarding its legislative history in favor of their 
own states’ views of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  Further-
more, amendment of the DTSA, while perhaps wise, would be 
impractical given the current climate of gridlock in Congress.99 
A. The Text of the DTSA 
A close examination of the statutory language within the 
DTSA suggests that the inevitable disclosure doctrine should not 
be applied to prove misappropriation of a trade secret in cases 
brought under the statute.  The language of 18 U.S.C. § 1836, 
which establishes the civil cause of action, and section 1839, 
 
95 235 F. Supp. 3d. 559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
96 See id. 
97 See Bruns, supra note 16, at 488–89; M. Claire Flowers, Note, Facing the In-
evitable: The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 
2016, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2207, 2233 (2018).  
98 See Bruns, supra note 16, at 491; Flowers, supra note 97, at 2213–14. 
99 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, 
Only Gloom is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/01/27/us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Y33Z-23AF] (arguing that the current political climate “has pushed an already 
dysfunctional Congress into a near-permanent state of gridlock that threatens to 
diminish American democracy itself”). 
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which defines key terms in the statute, conflict with the use of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine to establish circumstantial ev-
idence of misappropriation in a number of ways.  First, the stat-
ute’s definition of “misappropriation” requires knowledge that the 
trade secret was “acquired by improper means,” an element that 
is absent from the inevitable disclosure doctrine analysis.100  
Second, the statute’s definition of “improper means” is also incon-
sistent with an application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
because the doctrine does not require a finding of theft, bribery, 
or espionage on the part of a former employee.101  Third, the strict 
requirements of the ex parte seizure provision reflect an inten-
tion not to place restraints on employment.102  Finally, the DTSA’s 
injunction remedy authorized under the statute specifically pro-
hibits injunctions that would prevent a person from taking on 
certain employment.103 
1. The Definition of Misappropriation 
The DTSA added section 1836 to Title 18 of the United 
States Code.  That section authorizes the “owner of a trade secret 
that is misappropriated [to] bring a civil action under this sub-
section if the trade secret is related to a product or service used 
in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”104  The 
DTSA defines “misappropriation” as follows: 
(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who 
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was 
acquired by improper means; or 
(B) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without ex-
press or implied consent by a person who—  
(i)  used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade 
secret; 
(ii)  at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to 
know that the knowledge of the trade secret was— 
(I) derived from or through a person who had used im-
proper means to acquire the trade secret; 
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty 
to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit 
the use of the trade secret; or 
 
100 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (2018). 
101 See id. § 1839(6)(A). 
102 See id. § 1836(b)(2). 
103 See id. § 1836(b)(3). 
104 Id. § 1836(b)(1). 
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(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty 
to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy 
of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade 
secret; or 
(iii)  before a material change of the position of the person, 
knew or had reason to know that— 
(I)  the trade secret was a trade secret; and 
(II)  knowledge of the trade secret had been acquired by 
accident or mistake.105 
This definition enumerates a number of potential types of trade 
secret misappropriation that are actionable under the statute.106  
In order to fully demonstrate the inapplicability of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, it is necessary to consider each part of the 
definition in turn. 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A), misappropriation is defined as 
“acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or 
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by im-
proper means.”107  This definition requires the defendant to have 
knowledge of how the trade secret was acquired.  But the inevi-
table disclosure doctrine does not require an inquiry into what 
the defendant actually knows or definitive proof that the defen-
dant acquired the trade secret.108  Courts have found it sufficient 
that a plaintiff’s former employee went to work for a “serious 
competitor” and would be taking on a similar position with his 
new employer.109  Moreover, plaintiffs have not been required to 
prove that defendants or new employers knew, nor should have 
known, that the former employees had retained any knowledge of 
the plaintiffs’ trade secrets.110 
Under section 1839(5)(B)(i), misappropriation includes “dis-
closure or use of a trade secret of another without express or 
implied consent by a person who . . . used improper means to 
acquire knowledge of the trade secret.”111  By its plain terms, this 
provision requires use of improper means.  But under an inevita-
 
105 Id. § 1839(5). 
106 See id. 
107 Id. § 1839(5)(A). 
108 Instead, the inquiry is focused on whether the circumstances of an employee’s 
new employment will inevitably lead him or her to disclose the information. See 
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995). 
109 See Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2017 
WL 1954531, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
110 See id. at *7. 
111 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B)(i). 
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ble disclosure theory, a defendant-competitor could be held liable 
merely for the decision to hire a former employer of a competitor 
for a similar position.112  Even if the defendant used or disclosed 
trade secret information inadvertently, the decision to hire a new 
employee is inconsistent with a common sense understanding of 
the phrase “improper means.”  Black’s Law Dictionary has de-
fined “improper conduct” as “behaviour that a reasonable and 
sensible person would not do.”113  The American Heritage Diction-
ary defines “improper” as “[n]ot in keeping with conventional 
mores; indecorous . . . ,” and it defines “means” as “[a] method, a 
course of action, or an instrument by which an act can be 
accomplished or an end achieved.”114  The decision to hire a 
certain employee is not unreasonable behavior that a “sensible 
person would not do” nor an “indecorous” course of action.  Hiring 
an employee with expertise valuable to one’s company, even one 
who worked for a competitor, is relatively commonplace.  Fur-
thermore, the statute itself gives the term “improper means” a 
specific definition.115  The doctrine rests on the assertion that a 
former employee “cannot help but rely on [a plaintiff’s] trade 
secrets.”116 
The third definition of misappropriation contemplated by 
section 1839(5)(B) is the “disclosure or use of a trade secret of an-
other without express or implied consent by a person who . . . at 
the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that 
the knowledge of the trade secret was” derived through a person 
who used improper means to acquire it or had a duty to maintain 
the secrecy of the information.117  This subsection appears to 
reject the idea that a defendant-corporation could be held liable 
absent knowledge of the source of the trade secret.  Under the in-
evitable disclosure doctrine, the plaintiff does not have to allege 
any knowledge on the part of the defendant-competitor.118  In ad-
 
112 See Molon Motor & Coil Corp., 2017 WL 1954531 at *6. 
113 Improper Conduct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). 
114 Improper, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2011); Means, AM. HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2011). 
115 See infra Section II.A.2; 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6). 
116 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995). 
117 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B). 
118 See Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2017 
WL 1954531, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017) (“Molon’s allegations on the direct com-
petition between the parties, as well as the . . . similarity of Desai’s quality control 
work . . . are enough to trigger the circumstantial inference that the trade secrets 
inevitably would be disclosed . . . .”). 
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dition, the plaintiff need not allege that the defendant actually 
disclosed or used any trade secret information. 
Finally, section 1839(5)(B) provides that misappropriation 
includes “disclosure or use of a trade secret . . . by a person 
who . . . knew or had reason to know that . . . the trade secret was 
a trade secret[,] and . . . knowledge of the trade secret had been 
acquired by accident or mistake.”119  As noted above, the inevita-
ble disclosure doctrine does not require an inquiry into what the 
defendant-competitor corporation actually knows.120  Nor need a 
plaintiff allege any actual use or disclosure of the trade secret on 
behalf of the defendant.121  As a result, the definitions of misap-
propriation under the DTSA are in direct conflict with the re-
quirements of misappropriation under the inevitable disclosure 
theory. 
2. The Definition of Improper Means 
A proper understanding of the DTSA’s definition of misap-
propriation relies heavily on the statue’s definition of “improper 
means.”  Section 1839(6) indicates that improper means “include[ ] 
theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a 
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through 
electronic or other means,” and “does not include reverse 
engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful means 
of acquisition.”122  Under this definition, the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine does not require improper means.  Courts that apply the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine look at factors including the level of 
competition between the competitors, the similarity of the former 
employee’s new position to his or her old position, and the trust-
worthiness of the new employee not to reveal the plaintiff’s trade 
secrets.123  This analysis does not involve a determination that 
the defendant engaged in any of the “improper means” enumer-
ated by the DTSA.  One could argue that the inevitable disclo-
sure theory could rely on the “breach . . . of a duty to maintain 
secrecy” language of section 1839(6).124  However, the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine does not require a breach of a duty to 
 
119 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B). 
120 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
121 See PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1269–70. 
122 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6). 
123 See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, No. 06-CV-02972, 2008 WL 9894350, at *18 (D.S.C. 
Mar. 14, 2008). 
124 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6). 
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maintain secrecy because the former employee need not actually 
disclose the trade secret.  A plaintiff need only allege that the con-
ditions of employment make it likely that the employee will 
disclose the information.125 
3. The Requirements Under the Ex Parte Seizure Provision 
One remedy authorized by the DTSA is an ex parte seizure 
procedure.126  Upon an ex parte application, the court may “issue 
an order providing for the seizure of property necessary to 
prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that 
is the subject of the action.”127  Although this remedy was de-
signed to be used “only in extraordinary circumstances,” the spe-
cific requirements for an order to be issued suggest a rejection of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine.128  For example, to obtain an 
order for the seizure of property, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant actually misappropriated the trade secret.129  In other 
words, the ex parte order cannot be based on the mere possibility 
of misappropriation.  Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, a 
court may grant relief based on circumstantial evidence that the 
former employee will eventually disclose or use the trade secret 
at his new job.130  Under the DTSA, the plaintiff must show that 
the defendant actually possesses the trade secret in order to 
obtain an ex parte order.131  The statute also notes that the sei-
zure should “be conducted in a manner that minimizes any 
interruption of the business operations of third parties.”132  In the 
context of an inevitable disclosure theory, the business operation 
of third parties could include the decision of a competitor to hire 
a former employee of the owner of a trade secret.  However, the 
DTSA requirements suggest that Congress sought to authorize 
the most severe punishment for a specific type of trade misap-
propriation—the deliberate theft of trade secrets for use or 
 
125 See Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2017 
WL 1954531, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
126 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2). 
127 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 
130 See Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at *13 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (holding that an injunction could be granted based on the inference 
that defendant would inevitably disclose plaintiff’s trade secrets to his new employer). 
131 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V). In contrast, under the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, a former employee is not required to actually possess the trade secret.  
132 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
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disclosure by a competitor.133  Although the requirements for an 
injunction or a claim for damages are more lenient, the strict re-
quirements for an ex parte order suggest that Congress did not 
intend to restrain legitimate business activity and impact 
employment. 
4. Limitations Within the Injunctive Relief Provision 
Apart from monetary damages or an ex parte seizure order, 
the DTSA authorizes a third remedy—injunctive relief.134  The 
injunction may be granted “to prevent any actual or threatened 
misappropriation” of a trade secret.135  However, section 1836(b)(3) 
contains two restrictions on the court’s discretion to craft an 
injunction.  The injunction may not “prevent a person from enter-
ing into an employment relationship” or “otherwise conflict with an 
applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a law-
ful profession, trade, or business.”136  Under section 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I), 
any conditions on employment within an injunction must “be 
based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely 
on the information the person knows.”137  Although these limita-
tions do not apply to an action to recover damages for trade secret 
misappropriation, a complete reading of the statute suggests that 
the DTSA was not meant to adversely impact the ability of em-
ployees to take on a similar position with a competitor.  
B. The Legislative History of the DTSA 
In addition, the legislative history and statements of 
members of Congress regarding the DTSA contradict the use of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine in cases brought under the 
statute in at least three important ways.  First, statements from 
members of Congress relating to their understanding of the con-
cept of trade secret misappropriation suggest that the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine is inconsistent with their intent.  These state-
ments demonstrate that trade secret misappropriation was meant 
to refer to theft and economic espionage.  Second, Congress 
enacted the DTSA to create a new remedy for the theft of trade 
secrets and sought to balance the goals of the statute with the 
 
133 See infra Section II.B.1. 
134 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
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rights and needs of third parties.138  Third, shortly before the 
bill’s passage, Congress amended the statute to limit the injunc-
tive relief provision to prohibit injunctions that place a limit on 
employment.139  This amendment suggests that Congress sought 
to protect the rights of employees in enacting the DTSA. 
1. Deliberate Theft and Economic Espionage 
Congress’s understanding of trade secret misappropriation is 
inconsistent with the application of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine to DTSA claims.  Generally, the statements of members 
of Congress during the debate and passage of a statute can be 
used to reinforce its apparent meaning.  The language of the 
statements by many Congress members during debate on the bill 
indicates that they intended the DTSA to combat deliberate theft 
of trade secrets and economic espionage.  By contrast, the goal of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine is to combat the potential dis-
closure of trade secret information by former employees to their 
new employers.140 
Throughout the debate on the statute, lawmakers made 
statements that indicated the DTSA was designed to prevent and 
punish deliberate theft of trade secrets and confidential informa-
tion.  In 2015, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hear-
ing entitled “Protecting Trade Secrets: The Impact of Trade 
Secret Theft on American Competitiveness and Potential Solutions 
to Remedy This Harm.”141  In its later report on the DTSA, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee cited statistics on the theft of trade 
secret information in support of the need for the bill.142  
Specifically, the committee noted that “annual losses to the 
American economy caused by trade secret theft are over $300 
billion” and “trade secret theft has led to the loss of 2.1 million 
American jobs each year.”143  The final draft of the bill included 
section 4, which requires the Attorney General to prepare a re-
port on “the scope and breadth of trade secret theft from United 
States companies” and “the threat posed by trade secret theft 
occurring outside of the United States.”144 
 
138 See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 8 (2016). 
139 See id. at 8–9. 
140 See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995). 
141 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 4. 
142 See id. at 1–2. 
143 Id. at 2. 
144 Id. at 11. 
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During floor debate, DTSA co-author Senator Orrin Hatch 
explained that the bill was meant to address “the need to recover 
a stolen trade secret.”145  During the House debate, Representa-
tives Collins, Nadler, Jeffries, and Lee used the phrases “trade 
secrets theft” and “trade secret theft” when discussing the 
conduct the DTSA was designed to combat.146  Representative 
Collins, a co-sponsor of the bill, stated that the DTSA “allows 
victims of trade secrets theft to obtain a seizure.”147  Represen-
tative Nadler, another co-sponsor, praised the bill for helping to 
combat trade secret theft at a time when “it has never been 
easier to transfer stolen property across the globe with the click 
of a button” just by using today’s technology.148 
Speaking on the purpose of the bill, Representative 
Goodlatte explained that the statute was “creating a Federal civil 
remedy for trade secrets misappropriation that will help Ameri-
can innovators protect their intellectual property from criminal 
theft by foreign agents and those engaging in economic 
espionage.”149  Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine frame-
work, an employee or competing company can be held liable 
based on its decision to enter a new employment relationship.150  
Employment decisions are far from similar to “criminal theft” or 
“economic espionage.”  Choosing to hire a particular employee 
does not involve any specific intention to steal information from a 
competitor.  The confidential information the employee may have 
acquired was also not taken intentionally.  Furthermore, the inevi-
table disclosure doctrine was not developed to combat intentional 
theft, but rather was developed to combat the eventual disclosure 
of information by a former employee.151 
2. The Balanced Goal of the DTSA 
Apart from a desire to combat the deliberate theft of trade 
secrets, Congress also intended to balance the effort to protect 
trade secrets with the rights of defendants and legitimate 
businesses.  Much of the debate and discussion of the DTSA on 
 
145 162 CONG. REC. S1634 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
146 162 CONG. REC. H2032–H2034 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016). 
147 Id. at H2032 (statement of Rep. Collins). 
148 Id. at H2033 (statement of Rep. Nadler). 
149 Id. at H2030 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte). 
150 Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL 
1954531, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017). 
151 See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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the floor of Congress endorses the view that the statute was 
meant to be a balanced measure that would consider the legiti-
mate business interests involved in trade secrets claims.  For 
example, the Senate Judiciary Committee report indicates that 
“it is important when seizing information to balance the need to 
prevent or remedy misappropriation with the need to avoid 
interrupting the legitimate interests” of defendants or third 
parties.152  The committee concluded that the DTSA is “narrowly 
drawn legislation” and is “designed to avoid disruption of legit-
imate business . . . .”153  The House Judiciary Committee report 
explained that “the legislation is designed to avoid disruption of 
legitimate businesses” and is “[c]arefully balanced to ensure an 
effective and efficient remedy for trade secret owners.”154  During 
floor debate in the House, Representative Nadler noted that the 
DTSA “carefully balances the rights of defendants and the needs 
of American businesses to protect their most valuable assets.”155 
Similarly, while discussing the ex parte seizure provision, 
Senator Hatch stated that “[t]he provision is tailored to prevent 
abuse—balancing the need to recover a stolen trade secret with 
the rights of defendants and third parties.”156  He emphasized that 
“third parties would not be harmed if an order were granted,” 
and the drafters “also included damages for wrongful sei-
zure . . . .”157  The House Judiciary Committee report, comment-
ing on the same provision, noted that any seizure ordered under 
the DTSA should “minimize any interruption to the business 
operations of third parties” while also “protect[ing] the seized 
property from disclosure.”158  The House report also emphasized 
the balanced nature of the statute and noted that “the legislation 
is designed to avoid disruption of legitimate businesses.”159  The 
desire to balance the mission of the DTSA with the needs of 
legitimate businesses conflicts with the application and goals of 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  The doctrine was designed to 
combat potential disclosures of information based on the move-
ment of employees.160  The imposition of liability in such circum-
 
152 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 12 (2016). 
153 Id. at 14. 
154 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 6 (2016). 
155 162 CONG. REC. H2033 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Nadler). 
156 162 CONG. REC. S1634 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
157 Id. 
158 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 5. 
159 Id. at 6. 
160 See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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stances could have an impact on hiring decisions.161  This impact 
on employment decisions could result in a “disruption of legitimate 
businesses” that the drafters of the DTSA were trying to avoid.162 
3. Amendment to Injunctive Relief Provision 
Congress enacted the DTSA to combat the increasing prob-
lem of trade secret theft around the country.163  The injunctive 
relief provision, as noted above, was intended to provide an addi-
tional remedy for trade secret misappropriation.  However, certain 
members of Congress, including Senator Dianne Feinstein of 
California, expressed “concern that the injunctive relief author-
ized under the bill could override state-law limitations that 
safeguard employee mobility.”164  In response to these concerns, 
the bill was amended to prohibit injunctions that “prevent a 
person from entering into an employment relationship.”165  In its 
report on the DTSA, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that 
the amended version of the injunctive relief provision “reinforces 
the importance of employment mobility.”166  Given Congress’s 
serious concerns regarding trade secret theft, its decision to 
amend the statute to limit the injunctive provision indicates that 
members of Congress placed a high value on continued employee 
mobility.  The inevitable disclosure theory is used most often in 
the context of a former employee choosing to work for a 
competitor.167  The importance Congress has placed on employee 
mobility supports a rejection of this theory of liability—at least in 
the way some district courts have applied the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine. 
C. Amendment to the DTSA is Unnecessary and Impractical 
Given the statutory text outlined above, as well as the 
DTSA’s legislative history, amendment of the DTSA is both un-
necessary and impractical.  Some commentators have suggested 
that amendment of the Act is necessary to expressly preempt the 
 
161 See infra Part III. 
162 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 6. 
163 See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016). 
164 Id. at 8. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 9. Similar language can be found in the House Judiciary Committee re-
port on the same provision. H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 12 (“These limitations on 
injunctive relief were included to protect employee mobility . . . .”). 
167 See Schaller et al., supra note 31, at 636. 
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inevitable disclosure doctrine.168  Such authors cite to the federal 
courts that have applied the doctrine in the period following the 
passage of the DTSA to support this view.169  However, such con-
cerns about preemption and amendment are unwarranted for 
several reasons.   
For one, a complete reading of the statute, noting the 
provisions outlined above, provides ample support for the view 
that the inevitable disclosure doctrine is inapplicable under the 
DTSA.  The text of the DTSA, through the definitions of misap-
propriation and improper means, the strict requirements for ex 
parte seizures, and the amendments to the injunctive relief 
provision, indicate that the inevitable disclosure doctrine is 
incompatible with the DTSA.170  Additionally, courts that apply 
the doctrine to claims under the DTSA typically fail to consider 
whether the passage of the DTSA impacts the applicability of the 
doctrine.  When applying the doctrine, such courts instead refer 
to their own state’s law or pre-DTSA case law.171  As a result, 
these courts are improperly ignoring the text and legislative 
history of the DTSA.  If federal courts employed the tenets of 
statutory interpretation advocated by this Note, a potential 
amendment to the statute would become unnecessary. 
Furthermore, Congress is unlikely to rise to the task of 
amending the DTSA in light of the current political climate.  As 
of the 2018 midterm elections, the House is controlled by a 
Democratic majority, while Republicans hold the Senate and the 
presidency.172  Such periods of divided government are often the 
least productive for Congress.173  At the moment, Congress ap-
pears unable—or unwilling—to address even the most urgent 
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7795125, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2017) (citing the pre-DTSA case, PepsiCo, Inc. v. 
Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269–70 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
172 See Shawn Zeller, Divided Government Will Pose an Obstacle to Lawmaking 
in 2019, ROLL CALL (Jan. 3, 2019, 7:03 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/ 
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than at any time in modern history.” Id.  
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issues facing the country today.174  Scholars have argued that 
increased polarization, “relative parity” between support for the 
two major parties, and divided government have all contributed 
to “gridlock and policy stalemate” in Congress.175  As a result, 
even attempting to amend the DTSA would be impractical.  
Instead, the courts should adopt a reading of the DTSA that 
encompasses the entire statute and gives proper deference to the 
legislative history and purpose of the Act.   
III.  THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE 
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE ON EMPLOYMENT 
The inevitable disclosure doctrine should not be used as a 
means of proving trade secret misappropriation, because neither 
the text nor the legislative history of the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act supports its application.  This interpretation of the statute 
and its history will also alleviate concerns that the DTSA will 
negatively impact employee mobility and industry innovation.  In 
November 2015, a group of law professors submitted a letter to 
Congress indicating their opposition to the DTSA.176  They ar-
gued that the language of the injunctive relief provision, 
although appearing to reject the doctrine, implicitly recognizes 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine.177  The professors proceeded to 
argue that federal recognition of the doctrine could have serious 
impacts on employment, as well as economic growth and innova-
tion.178  This argument reflects the concerns of other commentators 
regarding the employment impacts of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine.179  
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Application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine has the po-
tential to place serious constraints on individual employee 
mobility.  Jurisdictions that reject the doctrine argue that the 
doctrine “ ‘creates a de facto covenant not to compete’ and ‘run[s] 
counter to the strong public policy . . . favoring employee mobili-
ty.’ ”180  In states that apply the doctrine, the threat of liability 
under an inevitable disclosure theory can restrict employees’ 
decisions to leave their current employers for better positions at 
competing employers.181  The possibility that they could be held 
liable for trade secret misappropriation—if courts are likely to 
find that they will inevitably disclose trade secrets based on 
circumstantial probability—may discourage employees from 
taking jobs with competitors.182  The inevitable disclosure doc-
trine infringes on the fundamental employment law principle of 
at-will employment and undermines employees’ ability to move 
from job to job freely.183 
The inevitable disclosure doctrine can also impact innovation 
and the legitimate interests of businesses.  For example, compet-
ing employers may be unwilling to hire a former employee of 
their competitor if they might be held liable for trade secret 
misappropriation.184  Smaller companies that compete with larger 
companies may be unable to hire experienced employees if they 
were previously employed by a competitor.185  As a result, these 
companies will be limited in their access to the best professionals 
within a given field.  In addition, the threat of liability under an 
inevitable disclosure theory could stifle the creation of new com-
panies by former employees of owners of trade secrets.186  Without 
employee mobility and the creation of new business ventures, 
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economic growth would stagnate.187  In this way, the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine runs counter to the main goal of the DTSA—to 
prevent the economic loss created by the theft of trade secrets.188 
CONCLUSION 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act is a powerful new tool for 
owners of trade secrets that have had their valuable confidential 
information stolen or misappropriated.  The federal civil remedy 
provides a streamlined process for the adjudication of these 
claims.  The previous patchwork of state law regimes was chal-
lenging to navigate.  However, Congress did not intend to allow 
for use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine under this new 
scheme.  The inevitable disclosure doctrine allows the owner of a 
trade secret to prove a claim of misappropriation based on the 
circumstances of a former employee’s new employment with a 
competitor.  The doctrine allows for a circumstantial inference of 
misappropriation absent any evidence that the defendant 
actually acquired, used, or disclosed the trade secret.  This doc-
trine, although not adopted by all jurisdictions, plays a signifi-
cant role in trade secret law around the country. 
But increased application of the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine has the potential to limit employment opportunities.  
Liability under an inevitable disclosure theory risks that an 
employee could be held liable for the decision to take on a new job 
with a competitor.  Alternatively, an employer could be held 
liable for the decision to hire a certain employee.  This theory of 
liability conflicts with an employee’s fundamental right to take 
on new employment freely. 
Nonetheless, both the text and the legislative history of the 
DTSA lead to the conclusion that the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine theory of liability should be rejected by courts interpret-
ing the statute.  The definition of misappropriation and improper 
means, as well as the requirements under both the ex parte 
seizure and injunctive relief provisions, demonstrate that the 
DTSA is incompatible with the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  
Furthermore, the legislative history reveals that Congress did 
not intend to include the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the 
DTSA.  Rather, it intended to protect employee mobility and min-
imize disruption to the legitimate business of third parties. 
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